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Medical and recreational marijuana legalization, and public acceptance, is in a rapid state 
of change across the nation. Currently, there are 20 states along with the District of 
Colombia that have medical marijuana laws. Each of these state governments has passed 
legislation on a drug for medical purposes, in which the federal government maintains 
there was, and still remains, no basis for medical use. Additionally, Colorado and 
Washington have recently passed laws legalizing recreational marijuana use. These state 
laws are in conflict with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and place 
marijuana in a simultaneous legal and illegal status. This thesis will examine the history 
of the war on drugs and the role marijuana has filled in traditional policy. Conflicting 
state and federal marijuana laws, and various shifting international policies will be 
addressed in order to better understand the future strategic implications of staying with 
current policies or shifting to new ones. For the general public and policy makers alike, 
the most productive path forward is one examines the historical background, 
acknowledges current domestic and international perspectives, and gives equal weight to 
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The United States federal government has pursued a strong interdiction policy 
towards narcotics for nearly a century and spent the last 40 years waging a “war on 
drugs.” In this fight, the United States is not alone, the world as a whole has seen 
consistent drug use trends with every country participating in some form of drug 
prevention and control. Marijuana has traditionally been categorized along with narcotic 
drugs as illegal and subject to criminal penalties. The United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime recognizes that a balanced approach between reduction to supply and 
reduction in demand are required for the international community to make progress on 
stemming the threat of illegal drug use.1 Despite U.S. and U.N. efforts to reduce or 
eliminate drug use, many countries as well as several U.S. states are pursuing alternate 
policies that include decriminalization and legalization of marijuana. What is the history 
of the war on drugs, and what role has marijuana filled in traditional policy? How do 
medical and recreational marijuana factor into the policy debate? How committed are 
nations that are changing their policy stance on marijuana? As perspectives on the issue 
begin to shift away from traditional U.S. policy on the subject, the political narratives and 
history of how we arrived at this point are important to understand future strategic 
implications of staying the course or shifting to new policies. 
B. SHIFTING POLICY 
Billions of dollars have been spent to control the flow of drugs from nations 
outside of the United States. The U.S. is historically one of the world’s largest consumers 
of illegal narcotics while at the same time leading world policy on enforcement and 
eradication measures. U.S. federal law classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug along 
with heroin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012 (Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations Publication, 2012), iii.  
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refers to Schedule I drugs as “drugs with no currently accepted medical use and a high 
potential for abuse. Schedule I drugs are the most dangerous drugs of all the drug 
schedules with potentially severe psychological or physical dependence.”2 Cocaine and 
methamphetamine are considered Schedule II drugs and therefore less dangerous than 
those classified as Schedule I, yet as recently as November 2012 Colorado and 
Washington voted to legalize marijuana for recreational use. Currently, there are 20 states 
along with the District of Colombia that have medical marijuana laws in place.3 See 
Figure 1. Each of these state governments has passed legislation on a drug for medical or 
recreational purposes, in which the federal government maintains there was, and still 
remains, no basis for any type of use. The state laws are in conflict with the federal 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and place marijuana in a simultaneous legal and illegal 
status.4 
                                                 
2 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “Drug Scheduling,” U.S. Department of Justice, accessed 
November 16, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/dea/druginfo/ds.shtml. 
3 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Marijuana,” The White House, accessed August 31, 
2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/marijuana. 
4 Todd Grabarsky, “Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat to 




Figure 1.  Conflicting state verses federal marijuana legislation in 2013.5 
Law Professor Robert Mikos, who specializes in federalism and criminal law, 
states that the dispute over medical marijuana is “one of the most important federalism 
disputes in a generation.”6 Additionally, other nations are experiencing shifting political 
viewpoints on criminalization and legalization. Uruguay’s lower house passed a bill to 
legalize marijuana in July of 2013 with expectations that it would pass in the senate and 
be approved by the executive branch. As of December 10, 2013 the Uruguayan Senate 
approved the measure in a 16–13 vote and became the first country in the world to 
legalize marijuana.7 A congressional report in 2005 on the 108th Congress stated: 
                                                 
5 Marijuana Policy Project, “Map of State Marijuana Laws,” August 1, 2013, 
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/Map-of-State-Marijuana-Laws.jpg. 
6 Robert Mikos, On the Limits of Federal Supremacy: When States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana 
Bans, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, 2012, 3, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/limits-
federal-supremacy-when-states-relax-or-abandon-marijuana-bans. 




The U.S. government remains committed to a policy of zero tolerance 
when it comes to the use of controlled substances. A different approach 
has recently emerged in Europe and Latin America as governments 
experiment with less restrictive policies, such as decriminalization and 
‘harm reduction’ measures.8  
The 108th Congress acknowledged that global drug policy partnerships with the U.S. 
were beginning to fracture. Policy shifts and enactment of new laws have only continued 
to accelerate in recent years. Currently, federal and state marijuana laws are in conflict, 
and U.S. foreign policy practices are being called into question based on these 
differences.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
All topics on illicit substances tend to be highly contentious and include debates 
filled with facts and counter facts. For the general public and policy makers alike, the 
most productive path forward is one examines the historical background, acknowledges 
current domestic and international perspectives, and gives equal weight to research of all 
possible solutions. Drug use and abuse along with supply or demand reduction as primary 
methods of control have over a hundred years of debate and legal history here in the 
United States. Marijuana has been part of this control regime for the majority of that 
time. Although it is tempting to address drug control as a whole, the scope, debate, and 
possible outcomes are too large and varied. Conversely, based on classification as a 
narcotic and legislative scheduling of marijuana with other drugs, it is important to 
address drug control history, funding, and political policies as a whole while addressing 
changes directed specifically at marijuana.  
Legalization measures in Washington, Colorado and Uruguay have the potential 
for global shifts on how the U.S. federal government as well as the rest of the world 
handles drug policy. Attitudes surrounding the legality of marijuana have varied in the 
past, yet until recently it has remained illegal, with both domestic and international law 
                                                 
8 Mark Eddy, War on Drugs: Legislation in the 108
th
 Congress and Related Developments 




enforcement in place to combat its supply and demand. Domestically, California 
Proposition 215, which voters approved in 1996, effectively legalized marijuana for 
medical purposes and initiated the growth of changing state marijuana policies.9 It is 
possible that current momentum is enough to propel wider decriminalization and 
legalization measures for marijuana; however, history shows that changes generally occur 
over long periods of time. Fears of drug abuse, crime, and corruption of youth all have 
merit and may also lead policy makers at the federal level to determine that 
decriminalization and legalization measures are far too politically risky. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a vast number of papers, articles, reports, and books that both support as 
well as criticize the United States’ “War on Drugs.” The U.S. federal government has 
continued to maintain a similar policy approach for the last four decades while various 
U.S. state and international governments have begun to look for new approaches. 
Research on the topic results in four basic types of information—government, academic 
books and papers, public policy organizations, and polemical information. Government 
reports include United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports, International 
Narcotics Control Board reports, White House strategy papers, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy reports, and Congressional Research Service reports. Academic books, 
papers, and public policy reports address politics, economics, history, dangers, and 
possible solutions to the current drug war. In general most of the academic and public 
policy work tend to address one of two opposing viewpoints. Both tighter controls and 
continued enforcement are necessary, or conversely that alternate approaches need to be 
explored based on a perception of policy failure. The remaining polemical information 
concerning marijuana and the drug war in general follows a similar trend in opposing 
viewpoints as that of academic and public policy reports. This information is 
acknowledged based on its ability to spur on the debate as well as the large amount in 
                                                 
9 Grabarsky, “Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies,” 7. 
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existence, however its use in this thesis will be minimal based on the majority being 
opinionated and frequently hostile in nature. 
1. Government 
The United Nations produces a number of publications through the Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) concerning international drug control policy, enforcement 
efforts and worldwide consumption information. The primary publication is an annual 
World Drug Report, which contains detailed information on statistics, trends, illicit 
markets, problems, patterns and updates that have occurred during the latest year.10 The 
UNODC is the “custodian of the drug and crime conventions and protocols.”11 The 
organization strives to have relevant and unbiased information in order to execute its 
mission of “contribute[ing] to the achievement of security and justice for all by making 
the world safer from crime, drugs and terrorism.”12 Information that is produced 
recognizes the global scale and implications of changing drug patterns and polices. 
Although the primary emphases is on rule of law and control of illicit substances, the 
content focuses on factual and statistical information and open assessments of challenges 
that face all nations concerning drugs, crime, and the links that are often between the two.  
The World Drug Report contains a separate subsection on marijuana within world 
drug markets and other subsections consisting of opiate, cocaine, and amphetamine-type 
stimulants.13 The most recent 2012 World Drug Report discusses that marijuana 
(referenced as cannabis in the report) is a drug that has a usage history dating back 
thousands of years, is currently used in every single country, and is produced in nearly all 
of them.14 It is admitted that historical data gathering has been limited based on small-
scale cultivation, production, and usage in local markets. Despite this admission, the 
                                                 
10 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012 (Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations Publication, 2012). 
11 “Mission Statement,” United Nations Office of Drug Control, accessed November 21, 2013, 
http://www.unodc.org/mexicoandcentralamerica/en/romex/mision.html. 
12 Ibid. 




UNODC gathers information from a wide variety of international data resulting in a 
comprehensive view of world supply, demand, and shifts amongst various markets. 
Additional recent UNODC reports, such as A Century of International Drug Control, and 
Cannabis: A Short Review, provide a wealth of information concerning history, policy, 
and current research on drugs in general as well marijuana control, medical usage, and 
recreational initiatives.15 UNODC information in context to other sources is unbiased in 
presentation, yet clearly adheres to preservation of current international law and policy 
regarding control and regulation of all narcotic substances. 
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) monitors compliance with 
international treaties concerning narcotics. The INCB is independent and quasi-judicial in 
executing its mandate of ensuring country compliance with the United Nations 
international drug control conventions. The INCB assesses each country’s compliance 
with the conventions and “is called upon to ask for explanations in the event of apparent 
violations of the treaties, to propose appropriate remedial measures to Governments that 
are not fully applying the provisions of the treaties or are encountering difficulties in 
applying them.”16 Similar to the UNODC, the INCB produces a wealth of information on 
specific countries and the drug control situation in each; however, the INCB advocates 
strict controls and promotes ridged adherence to the current enacted international laws. In 
light of recent legalization measures in Colorado, Washington and Uruguay, “The Board 
notes with serious concern the ongoing move towards the legalization of cannabis for 
non-medical purposes in some parts of the United States of America.”17 Additionally, 
prior to the recent Uruguayan Senate approval on marijuana, the INCB released the 
following statement: “The Board is very concerned that the draft legislation currently 
                                                 
15 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 100 Years of Drug Control (Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations Publication, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf.; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Cannabis: 
A Short Review (Vienna, Austria: United Nations Publication, 2012), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-prevention-and-treatment/cannabis_review.pdf. 
16 “Mandate and Functions,” International Narcotics Control Board, accessed November 21, 2013, 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html. 
17 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2012, International Narcotics Control 
Board, http://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2012.html, 11. 
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being considered in Uruguay would, if adopted, legalize production, sale and 
consumption of cannabis for recreational purposes.”18 The United States in particular is a 
founding member and historical proponent of international narcotics control and treaties. 
Any shift in the U.S. federal government’s policy stance towards decriminalization or 
legalization of any currently illicit drug would have international ramifications. 
President Barack Obama’s National Drug Control Strategy 2013 outlines the 
administration’s policy and international cooperation on drug control. It is clear that 
legalization initiatives are not part of the federal approach to solving the difficult 
problems associated with narcotic production, trafficking, and use. Instead, the 
administration states that it is charting a “third way” in policy that aims to balance health 
and law enforcement. Historically the U.S. has favored supply side elimination, strict law 
enforcement and harsh criminal penalties as methods of narcotic deterrent. Funding for 
treatment and prevention, although varied, has in general been neglected in favor of 
funding for law enforcement and a criminal prosecution approach. The most recent year 
funding for supply and demand reductions were evenly split was 1977.19 Subsequently, 
the trend was primarily two-thirds for supply reduction and one-third for demand 
reduction with a gradual shift towards a 2013 split of 59 percent for supply and 41 
percent for demand.20 The Obama administration acknowledges that drug addiction is a 
disease and proposes that a twenty-first century approach to drug policy balances public 
health, law enforcement and international partnerships. This policy shift attempts to 
rebalance towards reduction in demand through funding for public health, safety, 
prevention, and treatment. Marijuana’s prevalence, medical use claims, and shift in state 
laws are addressed specifically on the White House Office of National Drug Control 
Policy website. In order to answer the public debate concerning marijuana, a research- 
 
                                                 
18 International Narcotics Control Board, “INCB is Concerned about Draft Cannabis Legislation in 
Uruguay,” United Nations Information Service, accessed November 21, 2013, 
http://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/PressRelease/PR2013/press_release_191113e.pdf. 
19 Michael F. Walther, Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy (Carlisle: U.S. Army 
War College Press, 2012), 5. 
20 Ibid., 14. 
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based approach is put forward as the administrations preferred method. Facts, state laws, 
public health consequences, and Department of Justice (DOJ) information are all linked 
within the resource center.21 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) continually produces reports for 
Congress, many of which deal with drug control policy, international initiatives, foreign 
policy challenges, and the relationship between the U.S. and foreign governments 
concerning narcotic enforcement. Latin America and the Caribbean are priority regions 
for the United States concerning drug policy. In 2011, the CRS produced Latin America 
and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs to provide 
U.S. antidrug assistance program and Western Hemisphere policy issues for Congress.22 
Historical basis and current policy information is provided for Congress to review 
counterdrug assistance based on approved funding, foreign assistance conditions, and 
U.S. counter narcotics assistance. Specifically cited in the report is criticism of U.S. drug 
policy from the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, which is co-
chaired by former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.23 It is important to 
recognize that the U.S. provides significant funding—1.5 billion of the fiscal year 2014 
request of 25.4 billion—to various international governments located primarily within the 
Western Hemisphere as a partnership initiative on drug control and policy.24 The strength 
of these partnerships and the resulting return on investment are shaped by regional 
support and commitment to U.S. policies. Three additional reports were produced in 2013 
that amplify information concerning Latin America, International Drug Control Policy, 
and domestic ONDCP budget reauthorization concerns. Although CRS reports are 
another government source, they provide timely information on policy issues. The reports 
                                                 
21 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Policy and Research,” The White House, accessed 
November 21, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/policy-and-research. 
22 Clare Ribando Seelke et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and the U.S. 
Counterdrug Programs (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), accessed August 28, 
2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf.  
23 Ibid., 24. 
24 Liana Sun Wyler, International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses 




are compiled by area specialists and analysts that research and present information in a 
non-partisan format that specifically highlights various, and sometimes contentious, 
viewpoints on specific topics. 
2. Academic 
In researching full-length books that cover drug politics, two things tend to stand 
out. A majority of the books are a collection of chapters by multiple authors and a single 
editor. This format avoids a singular approach and presents a wide variety of research and 
policy perspectives.  Additionally, a large number of books were published in the very 
late 1980s up through all of the 1990s. An explanation for the explosion of information 
during this period is the renewal of the “war” with President Ronald Regan and follow-on 
expansion of efforts by George H.W. Bush. The time period is marked by an escalation in 
funding from millions to billions of dollars, a domestic theme of “zero tolerance,” 
strengthening of criminal penalties, and law enforcement that began including the Armed 
Forces.25 Based on these shifts in policy, it appears that many scholars started to ask 
questions about the effectiveness of approaches that were decades old. Marijuana is 
occasionally addressed as a stand-alone topic; however, in much of the literature it is 
more common to include policies on marijuana as a larger discussion concerning drugs 
overall. William O. Walker III, a history professor specializing in narcotics, edited 
several books containing a multitude of essays that selectively look at various aspects of 
drug policy, drug control, and cultural aspects of drug use in the Western Hemisphere. 
Each of the essays focuses on a specific aspect of drugs in relation to history, control, or 
policy.26 The approaches are analytical in nature and generally conclude that many of the 
policies in place have had significant failures based on the original objectives. Arguments 
                                                 
25 Eva Bertram et al., Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1996), 110; Walther, Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy, 7; U.S. Congress. 
House. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. HR 5729. 99th Cong., Library of Congress, accessed October 8, 
2013, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d099:H.R.5729:@@@L. 
26 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict, ed. 
William O. Walker III (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996); William O. Walker III, Drug Control 
Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective, edited by William O. Walker III (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
11 
 
are made that escalation of current failed policies will only continue to produce results 
that contain aspects of failure.27 The importance of this body of literature is in addressing 
the many questions that surround current and proposed legislation and foreign policy. 
Understanding the historical arguments that led to past policy and international 
agreements is used to highlight the difficulties that surround current practices as well as 
difficulties that lie in alternate approaches to control.28 
Although a large body of the information is centered on the 1990s, information 
has been published on marijuana policy and drug control for decades. Many contain 
similar arguments and continue to maintain relevance to the current questions of 
legalization today. Demonstrating the time span of this argument is a book titled 
Marijuana edited by Erich Goode and published in 1969. The editor addresses the 
controversy surrounding marijuana legalization and the views that “span the spectrum of 
possibilities—from complete legalization and unrestricted use to the institution of even 
stricter penalties.”29 The author goes on to state the three most common views in 1969 
are:  
one holds that the present legal status, with its present penalty structure, 
should be maintained; another holds that though illegality should be 
maintained, the penalties should be lessened. And the third favors 
legalization with restriction analogous to those placed on the consumption 
of liquor.30  
Forty-four years later the ramifications of each approach are still being debated. 
The stark difference however, is that today the U.S. currently has 20 state legalizations of 
marijuana for medical purposes and two state legalizations for recreational use. 
                                                 
27 Walker, Drug Control Policy, 1–4. 
28 Ibid., 8. 
29 Erich Goode, Marijuana, (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), 137. 
30 Goode, Marijuana, 137. 
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3. Public Policy 
Research papers from the RAND Corporation, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, the World Bank, the Strategic Studies Institute and others provide a variety of 
information concerning counter drug strategy, historical foundations, and alternatives. 
The RAND corporation produced two reports in 2010 dealing with changing marijuana 
policies that were primarily driven on the prospect that California would become the first 
state to pass legislation legalizing marijuana beyond medical use. Although California 
has yet to pass full legalization measures, the issues addressed are applicable based on 
Colorado and Washington’s recent legalization. The first, Marijuana Legalization: What 
Can Be Learned from Other Countries?, provides a summary of marijuana initiatives that 
have been put in place by countries around the world.31 Production and consumption 
innovations are separated and data is presented on each for the limited number of 
countries that have enacted policies different than the word wide norm of criminalization. 
The second, Altered State? Assessing How Marijuana Legalization in California Could 
Influence Marijuana Consumption and Public Budgets, is an in depth study that covers 
the overall California marijuana landscape, the evolving legal environment, projection of 
effects, and alternative scenarios.32 Of particular note is a section on possible federal 
responses, how congress would react and potential consequences. Each of these papers 
contains discussion items that approach marijuana legalization challenges from multiple 
angles and aid in an overall assessment of consequences.  
E. METHODS AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This paper will be a combination of historical and comparative study. I will 
examine the historical roots of drug policy in the U.S. and resulting foreign policy 
practices. Drug policy today is rooted in legislative actions of the past. The fundamental 
reasoning behind the implementation of those policies may give an indication of the 
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potential for a shift in federal policy on marijuana. As a part of the historical study, U.S. 
foreign policy on drug control will be examined to determine the effects of a possible 
change in federal policy on international relations.  
Medical marijuana has a growing list of participating states in legalization. 
Analysis of how medical marijuana initiatives have continued to grow and how they may 
conflict with recreational use initiatives will further expand the understanding of potential 
continued legalization efforts. 
Comparison of countries with historical or current shifting policies on marijuana 
will provide an international viewpoint on the same questions that the United States is 
facing with continued legalization efforts. Current federal policy remains unchanged and 
leads to both a conflict between state and federal law as well as international criticism of 
traditional foreign policy on U.S. drug control. Analysis of the most prominent countries 
with shifting policies will provide a deeper understanding of the potential for marijuana 
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II. WAR ON DRUGS: A HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Control of marijuana’s and its historical trajectory in the United States has been 
part of a larger scope question concerning all illicit substances. What led the U.S. to 
declare a “War on Drugs” to the extent that it became a U.S. domestic and foreign policy 
priority requiring annual expenditures of billions of dollars? The war on drugs as a whole 
has both domestic and foreign policy components that affect marijuana and need to be 
understood in order to analyze current and possible future marijuana debates. The U.S. is 
historically one of the world’s largest consumers of illegal narcotics while at the same 
time leading world policy on enforcement and eradication measures. Expanding conflicts 
between local, state, federal, and international visions of marijuana will continue to erode 
effective policy coordination and enforcement implementation if not addressed. How did 
we get to this point? Domestic drug war concerns, and subsequent policy, ultimately 
contribute to foreign policy in practice. Subsequently, those foreign policies can later 
shape domestic attitudes and practices. Federally, the U.S. has continued to maintain a 
similar domestic and foreign policy approach for the last four decades. U.S. states and 
international movements have begun to look for new approaches. Historical narratives are 
important to understand future strategic implications of staying the course or shifting to 
new policies. 
B. FIRST INROADS TO COMBAT NARCOTIC SUBSTANCES WITH 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The deepest roots of U.S. foreign policy on narcotics are in a 1906 endorsement 
of a report on the opium trade by the U.S. Department of State. The United States has a 
long domestic history with marijuana that dates back to the 1600s when plants were first 
brought to English colonies for rope and cloth.33 Subsequently, alcohol, opium, heroin, 
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and cocaine all played a role in American society with legal impunity up through the late 
1800s. Specifically, morphine use was high during and after the Civil War and opium 
continued to grow in both consumption and availability. As information grew on the 
medical as well as recreational use of various substances, there were local attempts at 
restriction, regulation, and labeling. Despite this, the federal government was minimally 
involved prior to acquiring the Philippians in 1898. Under Spanish rule, opium retail 
outlets had been set up in the Philippines with 190 outlets operating in the city of Manila 
alone.34 John McWilliams states, “After nearly three centuries of virtually no regulation 
of any drugs, a changing social climate at home and a desire to drive Chinese opium 
dealers out of the recently acquired Philippines compelled the government finally to 
act.”35 Although many other factors including race, religious prohibitionist attitudes, and 
perceptions of drug use and crime were contributors domestically, the Philippines set in 
motion the process of U.S. led international narcotics control. On August 8th 1903 the 
New York Times reported:  
Major Edwin C. Carter, Bishop Brent, and Dr. Albert had been appointed 
as an Opium Commission to visit countries where opium is used and 
ascertain the methods of regulation and control. The commission will visit 
Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, and Burma. An 
investigation of this kind is thought necessary on account of the opposition 
that has developed to the proposed bill for the regulation of opium.36 
The commission recommended that opium should be regulated and be for medical use 
only. In order to curb the domestic use in the Philippines, it was understood that the U.S. 
would have to solicit international effort.37 
At the suggestion of the U.S., an International Commission of Inquiry was formed 
to discuss and decide how to mitigate opium consumption. Trade in opium accounted for 
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significant revenue flows and had deep political interests; therefore, the majority of the 
great world powers of the time were invited to attend. The commission was held in 
Shanghai, China for 26 days in February of 1909. The U.S. brought wide scope opium 
question proposals for uniform national laws and cooperation. The British added program 
questions regarding morphine and cocaine, while the Italians added the question of Indian 
hemp drugs. None of the commission’s declarations were binding or had the ability to 
become international law. Based on the perceived importance of the opium problem, the 
U.S. proposed that a conference should be held at The Hague to give sanction to the 
resolutions.38 
On December 1, 1911, the International Opium Conference was held at The 
Hague. Early in conference it was recognized that participation was not wide enough for 
the scope of the topic. Twelve countries were represented and all had previously 
participated in the Shanghai commission. Of the 34 nations not represented, it was 
specifically recognized that no Latin American countries had been invited. Latin 
America’s impact on the subject stemmed from the fact that many of them had the raw 
materials and narcotic production ability for supply to other parts of the world. The U.S. 
along with the government of the Netherlands would be given the task of securing 
sympathy and signatures from Latin American nations in the years following the 
conclusion of the conference. By holding the conference at The Hague, the agreements 
became effective as international law in 1915 and subsequently set the foundation for 
international control of opium, morphine, heroine, and cocaine while excluding 
marijuana. By 1949, 67 countries had signed and ratified the treaty.39 
C. LEGISLATIVE BUILDUP AND CREATION OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 was a successfully passed version of 
previous attempts to pass legislation on domestic drug policy. Supporters of previous 
bills, specifically Dr. Hamilton Wright, saw the necessity of domestic narcotic control in 
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order for the United States to have foreign policy influence and credibility. Dr. Wright 
assisted in the creation of a bill that was introduced to Congress in 1910 by Congressman 
David Foster. The bill was designed to restrict the “nonmedical use of opiates, cocaine, 
chloral hydrate, and cannabis.”40 Ultimately, the bill introduced by Foster would fail 
based on its radical nature, failure to compromise on harsh prohibitionist measures, and 
lack of exemptions for the medical and pharmaceutical communities.41 Dr. Wright, along 
with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, would continue to advocate and solicit a 
sponsor for legislation that supported the State Departments international narcotics 
control stance.42 Congressmen Francis B. Harrison introduced a bill that had similarities 
to the Foster bill but left open provisions for discussion and compromise. After a year of 
debates and amendments the bill passed and was signed into law by President Woodrow 
Wilson in late 1914.43 The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was passed in the form of a tax 
bill in order to avoid concern regarding federal infringement on states policing powers.44 
Although marijuana had been excluded, the bill enforced registration, transaction records, 
and tax of opium, heroin, and morphine. The act was founded as a regulatory measure, 
but in essence it created a foundation for follow on prohibitionist and enforcement laws, 
as well as signaling a shift in mindset from addiction perceived as a disease to that of a 
criminal act.45 
Federal control and regulation continued to increase as perceptions of links 
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By April 1928, penitentiaries, with enough cells to hold 3,738 inmates, 
were housing 7,598 offenders….[by June of 1928] of the 7,738 prisoners 
incarcerated in the federal system, more than one-third—2529 or twice the 
number of the 1,156 prohibition offenders—were serving sentences for 
violating the Harrison law.46  
Continued efforts towards enforcement expansion resulted in the creation of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in July 1930 as a new agency within the Treasury 
Department. Harry J. Anslinger was appointed the agencies head and would remain in 
that position for the next 32 years until his retirement in 1962. Anslinger was aggressive 
in his promotion of anti-drug campaigns, actively protected FBN’s budget during the 
depression era, and worked to expand the agencies role in both domestic and foreign 
matters. Stepping into the office, “he believed that the primary enforcement challenge 
was to control the drug supply, particularly from abroad.”47  
It was not only drug flows from abroad that the United States was concerned with 
during the 1930s. The surplus labor supplied by Mexican migrants was unwelcome and 
led to suspicion, fear, and linkages between Mexicans, crime, and marijuana. The roots of 
marijuana control stem from domestic fears and misinformation as well as pressure on 
foreign governments to participate in international efforts towards drug eradication.48 
Latin American nations were a focus of U.S. pressure to enact controls on production and 
trafficking of drugs. This supply side pressure led Mexico to point to U.S. domestic 
consumption and demand.49 Although efforts were made to include marijuana into the 
Harrison Act, support was weak and the pharmaceutical industry was in opposition. 
Marijuana in American society was not viewed as a drug that spanned all classes 
and ethnicities in the same fashion as alcohol and tobacco. Although there were 
prohibitionist moral arguments against marijuana, the primary view was that it was a 
form of narcotic that was primarily used by ethnic minorities – specifically Mexican 
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migrants. Initially, towns that contained large Mexican migrant populations began 
passing anti-marijuana laws. This trend continued at the state level. Between 1915 and 
1933, 33 states had passed legislation prohibiting nonmedical marijuana.50 Richard 
Bonnie and Charles Whitebread relate these fears of social bias in The Marijuana 
Conviction:  
From this instinctive classification of marihuana with opium, morphine, 
heroin, and cocaine flowed the entire set of factual supports on which 
narcotics prohibition rested. Marihuana was presumed to be addictive, its 
use inevitably tending to excess. Since its users—Mexicans, West Indians, 
blacks, and underworld whites—were associated in the public mind with 
crime, particularly of a violent nature, the association applied also to 
marihuana, which had a similar reputation in Mexican folklore. Since the 
nation was preoccupied during the twenties with lawlessness, especially 
among the foreign born, this association was a strong one.51 
 By the mid 1930s, marijuana consumption had increased, social dynamics had 
changed to fear, and Anslinger’s view of marijuana prohibition had shifted to one that 
benefitted the FBN. Mexico felt that the U.S. was not doing enough to combat its own 
drug problems while pressure from within the U.S. mounted to enact further legislation to 
combat the marijuana problem.52 The Marijuana Tax Act passed in 1937 and was similar 
in function to the Harrison Act in that it was regulatory in nature, yet facilitated 
criminalization and subsequent enforcement. The Marijuana Tax Act restricted 
production, possession, sale, or transfer of marijuana to medical or industrial use. The 
Act required registration and reporting of all transactions and more importantly, a 
complicated a regulatory scheme with failures resulting in heavy fines and imprisonment. 
In an introduction to the full text of the Act posted at the Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, 
David Solomon highlights how the regulation was designed to discourage marijuana for 
any purpose.  
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The message becomes entirely clear when, having finished the short text 
of the Act itself, one proceeds to the sixty-odd pages of administrative and 
enforcement procedures…[which] calls for a maze of affidavits, 
depositions, sworn statements, and constant Treasury Department police 
inspection in every instance that marijuana is bought, sold, used, raised, 
distributed, given away, and so on. Physicians who wish to purchase the 
one-dollar tax stamp so that they might prescribe it for their patients are 
forced to report such use to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in sworn and 
attested detail, revealing the name and address of the patient, the nature of 
his ailment, the dates and amounts prescribed.53 
The effect of the tax act was that any association with marijuana outside of the 
strict provisions of the Act became a federal crime.54 
Two more pieces of legislation would also be passed after the nation began to 
reprioritize its focus following WWII. Drug War Politics states, “As the cold war began 
in earnest, the FBN shrewdly tied drugs to the foreign threat of communism. ‘Red’ China 
was accused of trying to destroy Western society and of securing hard cash through 
heroin sales to U.S. drug pushers.”55 Efforts to significantly increase the penalties for 
possession of narcotics resulted in the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act 
of 1956. The Boggs Act set in motion uniform mandatory minimum sentences for 
offences under the Marijuana Tax Act and Narcotics Import Export Act, with a first 
conviction resulting in a minimum of two and up to five years imprisonment. The second 
offense resulted in a mandatory five and up to ten, with the third conviction resulting in a 
mandatory 10 and up to 20 years of imprisonment with no possibility of parole. The 
Narcotics Control Act stiffened the uniform penalties and effectively doubled the 
provisions of the Boggs Act to include a provision to implement the death penalty for 
selling heroine to anyone under 18.56 Federal control of narcotics enforcement (with  
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marijuana penalties grouped solidly into the narcotics category) had been fully 
implemented domestically, yet the problem would grow and then explode during the 
1960s and 1970s. 
D. BEGINNING OF THE “WAR” WITH NIXON 
Nixon’s declaration of war and a subsequent push toward supply side strategies 
was based on domestic behavior in the 1960s. A significant spike in drug use occurred as 
youth rebellion and rejection of traditional values became wide spread. Heroine and 
marijuana use continued to rise along with newer drugs such as amphetamines and 
LSD.57 American ideals of personal freedom, a larger population with drug taking 
experience, and greater understanding of differences between various drugs pushed back, 
or simply disregarded, a system that lumped all drug possession and use as criminal and 
immoral. On the domestic stage, widespread use led popular distinctions between hard 
and soft drugs as well as perceived dangers to society.58 Movements to decriminalize 
marijuana began to take shape based on realizations of the damaging effects of single-
minded anti-drug punitive campaigns. An example of the level to which this change of 
mindset over the 1960s and 1970s had risen was, “During Carter administration [in the 
late 1970s], the president himself supported legislation to decriminalize position of small 
quantities of marijuana.”59 During the 1960s enforcement and penalties continued to 
increase while at the same time wide spread experimentation, and continued 
consumption, rapidly expanded. In the period between 1965 and 1970 marijuana arrests 
had increased tenfold and it is estimated that between 1960 to 1970 heroin addicts 
increased from 50,000 to half a million.60 
Internationally, progress on narcotics control had been overlapping and 
complicated by multiple legal agreements. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs aimed to streamline the process and subsequently became “the cornerstone of 
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today’s international drug control regime.”61 The Single Convention had three main 
objectives, all of which complimented the domestic efforts of the U.S. The first objective 
was to streamline, codify, and extend controls under a single document that all nations 
could accede to. The second was to simplify the existing machinery of control in order to 
increase efficiency. The International Narcotics Control Board (INBC) was effectively 
established through this objective. The third was to extend existing controls to raw 
materials, plant cultivation, and the prevention of consumption other than for medical 
reasons. By 2008, 183 nations had acceded to the 1961 Single Convention and its 
subsequent amendments.62 
Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign revolved around a domestic theme 
of “law and order.”63 His overall view was that domestic crime and drug use were 
inextricably linked. Crime rates had risen and Nixon’s approach was to increase 
penalties, link the concepts of drugs and crime together in the mind of the public, and 
embark on a crusade to eliminate narcotics through severing the trafficking supply lines 
as well as eradication within source countries. In a 1969 address to congress, Nixon 
stated, “Within the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a local 
police problem into a serious national threat to the personal health and safety of millions 
of Americans.”64 He went on to state,  
The problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency….Drug 
traffic is public enemy number one domestically in the United States today 
and we must wage a total offensive, worldwide, nationwide, government 
wide, and if I may say so, media wide.65  
Out of these announcements came legislation and law enforcement changes designed to 
include changes at home as well as a campaign abroad to intercept the U.S. public enemy 
number one.  
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Nixon’s domestic portion of the offensive war was designed to reorganize and 
increase enforcement through the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) as 
well implementation of the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
and associated Title II Controlled Substances Act (CSA).66 These laws aligned federal 
law with the international Single Convention law and implemented a series of schedules 
to classify each based on potential for abuse, safety risks, and prescription regulation. See 
Table 1. One of the more punitive measures of the act allowed for “no knock” warrants 
that allowed federal agents to search private homes and businesses suspected of drug 
activity.67 Nixon would go on to establish the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement 
(ODALE) directly under White House control. In 1973, he would consolidate the BNDD, 
ODALE, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, and the Customs Service Drug 
Investigation into the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which still operates today.68 
                                                 
66 Buxton, The Historical Foundations of the Narcotic Drug Control Regime, 24; Bertram, et al., Drug 
War Politics, 106. 
67 Bertram et al., Drug War Politics, 106. 




Table 1.   U.S. federal drug schedules under the Controlled 
Substances Act.69 
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On the foreign war front, drug producers and traffickers from abroad became 
national enemies. Nixon was determined to not only stop demand in the U.S. but to also 
to “strike at the ‘supply’ side of the drug equation—to halt the drug traffic by striking at 
the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, 
and trafficking in these drugs beyond our boarders.”70  
In June 1969, the U.S. made an attempt to convince Mexico to go after smugglers 
and enact a marijuana plant defoliation program. The Mexicans hesitated to enact any 
reforms or invest in the ideas of the U.S. In September of 1969 Operation Intercept was 
launched in an attempt to seal off the southern boarder from the flow of drugs, primarily 
marijuana. The concept was to place adequate Border, Customs, and Immigration agents 
along the 2,000-mile stretch to stop and inspect all traffic. Coordination with Mexican 
authorities on enactment of the new border inspection plan was minimal and took Mexico 
by surprise when it actually went into motion. The plan lasted only three weeks. Border 
crossing wait times increased to hours, businesses emptied in cities along the boarder, 
and commerce slowed. Based on the disastrous economic effects, the backlash from 
Mexico, and a perceived strain on future international relations, the plan was called off. 
Operation Intercept was successful in that it was replaced with a plan called Operation 
Cooperation designed to move Mexico and the United States into a shared strategy on 
drug enforcement.71  It also demonstrated Nixon’s resolve on making the war on drugs a 
foreign policy priority.  
Nixon’s other main foreign policy thrust in stemming the flow of narcotics 
involved Turkey. At the time it was estimated that Turkey produced 80 percent of the 
opium used to produce heroine in the United States. Diplomatic pressure was put on 
Turkey to dramatically reduce the amount of poppy cultivation to a number that could be 
justified for licit purposes. Turkey was a member of the 1961 Single Convention, yet had 
a long history of poppy cultivation that resulted in a large number of farmers dependent 
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on the crop for their livelihoods. After diplomatic discussions on the subject, the United 
States offered to assist Turkey in the effort to implement crop substitution for most 
farmers as well as licensing regulation for the amount of poppy required for the medical 
industry. The U.S. ultimately paid Turkey 35 million in aid for its efforts and considered 
the situation a resounding success in stopping the drug flow directly at the source.72 
A final indicator in this declaration of war is shown in funding level increases to 
wage it. Approximately $6 million was allocated for drug enforcement in the late 1960s. 
This number went to $43 million in 1970 and grew to $321 million by 1975. 
Interestingly, although Nixon declared the war on drugs, he is also credited with 
declaring victory and investing a larger share of funds to demand reduction. After his re-
election, in 1973 Nixon indicated the shift in strategy and focus when he stated, “We 
have turned the corner on drug addiction in the United States.”73 Regardless of this 
declaration, agencies continued to operate and funding continued to grow. The Ford and 
Carter presidencies would place focus in other areas without appreciably altering the 
policies Nixon had put in motion.74 They would also begin to shift funding balances 
between supply and demand reductions back towards supply. The balance in 1973 was 
the peak of spending for demand reduction at 70 percent despite the foreign policy and 
supply reduction strategies of Nixon. By the end of the Carter administration, 
supply/demand would be at 57/43 percent respectively.75  
E. RENEWAL OF THE “WAR” WITH REAGAN AND BUSH 
Shifts in domestic use patterns during the late 1970s and early 1980s led to the 
rise and widespread use of cocaine. The Ford and Carter administrations had toned down 
the emphasis on the drug war but also continued to expand funds, which led to a figure of 
$855 million by 1981.76 During president Ronald Reagan’s first year in office, he re-
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launched the “War on Drugs,” stating, “We have taken down the surrender flag and run 
up the battle flag. And we’re going to win the war on drugs.”77 A significant number of 
laws and acts were passed that consolidated federal drug enforcement agencies, drafted 
federal intelligence assets into the efforts, and paved the way for military involvement in 
trafficking enforcement through additions to the Posse Comitatus Act. Drug War Politics 
states, “Over the next twelve years the drug war escalated as never before, with budgets 
for drug law enforcement surging from $855 million to more than $7.8 billion in 1993.”78 
President Reagan presented his war on drugs as a national security priority. The 
slogan of the times was “zero tolerance” leading to shifts in both domestic and foreign 
policy.79 The First Lady, Nancy Reagan, led the media and school system campaign 
against drug use and abuse with the slogan, “Just say No.”80 The 1980s were filled with 
ads designed to increase public awareness of the political campaign to eradicate drug use 
and abuse. In 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act that introduced 
increased domestic penalties along with new approaches to enforcement that included 
Armed Forces support of civilian agencies. The official title of the bill presented a basic 
overview of sweeping changes that were contained. 
A bill to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in 
eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to 
improve enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of 
illicit drug shipments, to provide strong Federal leadership in establishing 
effective drug abuse prevention and education programs, to expand 
Federal support for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for 
other purposes.81 
The actual bill as enacted contained enough provisions to include 33 short titles. 
Some of theses titles included forfeiture of assets, career criminal enforcement, maritime 
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drug law enforcement, import and export penalties, and money laundering control.82 
Supply reduction took on a renewed focus leading to a balance shift of 70 percent of all 
funding aimed at supply eradication from source countries verses demand reduction.83 
This funding shift was less obvious to the American public based on the prominent 
domestic enforcement and treatment ad campaign message. South America was a specific 
focus in executing foreign policy on drug control in the 1980s. A system of federal 
certification was introduced that effectively terminated aid funding to any country not 
deemed in compliance with U.S. efforts on source eradication.84  
President George H.W. Bush further intensified the war on drugs. During the 
Reagan presidency, despite an increase of funding to $6.4 billion, drugs were more 
widespread, available, and cheaper by 1989.85 In response to the magnitude of the 
situation, Bush used his first televised national address to declare an “assault on all 
fronts” in order to combat the “gravest national threat facing the nation.”86 President 
Bush was the Vice President under Reagan and had been given the task of expanding 
control through the military and intelligence communities in the early 1980s. Florida was 
a primary entry point for the flow of narcotics from the south. In response, The Vice 
Presidents Task Force on South Florida was created to combine the efforts of FBI, 
Customs, IRS, ATF, DEA, Army, and Navy.87 When Bush took office in 1989, he 
expanded Reagan’s efforts and took them in a new direction. Source elimination, using 
military forces of the U.S. and Latin American nations, along with economic aid would 
become central to foreign policy priorities in the region. The announcement of the 
“Andean Strategy” in 1989 would put in motion Bush’s concept, “The Logic is simple. 
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The cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source….We need to 
wipe out crops wherever they are grown and take out labs wherever they exist.”88 
Military expenditures on drug enforcement grew from $357 million in 1989 to $1 billion 
by 1992.89 In 1989, President Bush signed National Security Directive 18 that “directed 
the Secretary of Defense to redefine the Pentagon’s mission to include counter narcotics 
as one of its core priorities.”90 The combination of the Andean Strategy and NSD 18 
solidified the foreign policy approach to the war. 
F. THE STATUS QUO AND SUBTLE SHIFTS WITH CLINTON, GEORGE 
W. BUSH, AND OBAMA  
The large scale drug war intensification efforts of the 1980s firmly entrenched 
funding, concepts, and norms of anti-drug efforts in public and policy circles. Bill Clinton 
entered office with various expectations that he would forge a moderate path with the 
potential for drug policy reform. Clinton had indicated that downscaling the high profile 
drug war was on his agenda and that treatment and prevention should be a primary 
focus.91 Like his statement that he tried marijuana but did not inhale, the message Clinton 
continued to send over his tenure was mixed and only included minimal efforts to create 
real change. Clinton’s primary challenge came from an unwillingness to look soft on 
drugs and crime as well as Congressional rejection of various proposed budgets and 
organizational downsizing.92 Several of the concepts that currently hold promise in 
changing drug control policy today were on the minds of individuals in Clinton’s 
administration. For example, Lee Brown, an early Clinton appointee as Drug Czar, stated, 
“You won’t hear us using the metaphor ‘drug war.’ We should help those who need help 
and arrest those who are trafficking in drugs. But I don’t think we should declare war 
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against our own people.”93 The Obama administration follows this example and currently 
avoids using the term “drug war” for discussion of drug control policy. Early in Clinton’s 
first term, Attorney General Janet Reno was critical of U.S. drug policy and advocated 
for changes to the justice system that focused on decriminalization and treatment for non-
violent addicts.94 Health care reform was also proposed in an attempt to address 
inadequate substance abuse treatment availability.  
Each of these attempts to shift the debate and enact policy reform met significant 
conservative resistance and ultimately led Clinton to de-emphasize drug control issues. 
Drug War Politics states, “Drug reform under Clinton failed because he was unwilling to 
pay the political costs of doing battle; but such costs would be high for any president—
and this makes the hope for presidentially led reform very slim.”95 In the absence of 
significant policy changes during the Clinton presidency, the existing narco-enforcement 
complex continued to escalate a war of criminalization and foreign supply eradication 
throughout the 1990s. Expenditures for drug control and enforcement during Clinton’s 
time in office climbed from $12.1 billion to $19.2 billion annually with 70 percent aimed 
at supply reduction in 2001.96 In the middle of this continued federal enforcement 
trajectory, California passed Proposition 215 in 1996. This proposition effectively set in 
motion the expansion of state medical marijuana laws that continue to remain in direct 
conflict with the federal Controlled Substances Act.  
Admittedly, the George W. Bush administration had prominent issues of terrorism 
and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as priorities. Initial criticisms of Clinton’s failures to 
make progress on fighting drug abuse faded and the federal status quo of enforcement 
and eradication as primary solutions continued while the administration focused on other 
wars. Bush also spoke of treatment, prevention, and demand reduction as possible 
winning strategies. Although these strategies were discussed, funding continued to 
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increase while supply-demand ratios remained relatively static. Over the eight-year 
period of George W. Bush’s presidency, $200 billion were allocated to the drug war with 
supply reduction remaining at just below 70 percent.97 One significant shift in 
justification for the war on drugs did occur in the post 9/11 security environment. In a 
2003 testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Steven McCraw, Assistant Director in 
the FBI Office of Intelligence, linked terrorism and drug trafficking.  
In framing the issue, the Committee astutely recognizes these links and the 
threat they present to the American people. That is why all aspects of the 
terrorist enterprise including funding and support must be attacked. The 
criminal nexus to terrorism including drug trafficking is why our local, 
state, and federal law enforcement partners throughout the U.S. and the 
world are essential to combating global terrorism.98 
Despite a stated understanding that demand reduction was likely to produce 
greater results in the drug war, the link to terrorism brought a renewed focus on 
partnerships with local, state, and federal law enforcement as the primary method to 
combat entwined drug trafficking profits and terrorism. Even with an eight year 
investment of $200 billion, former ONDCP director of planning and budget, John 
Carnevale, states the Bush administration “failed to achieve results with regard to its goal 
for adult drug use or in key outcome areas….Eight years were wasted.”99  
How does marijuana play into those “eight wasted years?” Crossing from Bush 
into the Obama administration, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) compiled 
information from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program and the U.S. Census to 
produce a report on marijuana arrest rates from 2001 to 2010. Of the many findings, 
several statistics stand out. First, overall marijuana arrest rates rose steadily to the point 
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where 2010 had 100,000 more arrests than were conducted in 2001.100 In that period, 
approximately eight million arrests were made involving marijuana. Second, of those 
arrests, 88 percent were simply for marijuana possession.101 Third, marijuana arrests 
accounted for 52 percent of all drug arrests in America.102 This equates to 46 percent of 
all drug related arrests attributed to simple marijuana possession.103 Lastly, blacks were 
3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana verses whites despite similar use rates 
of 14 and 12 percent respectively.104 Even without the racial disparities, the war on drugs 
is a complicated and controversial issue. With statistics of marijuana accounting for 
roughly half of all recent drug related arrests, understanding the entwined nature of 
marijuana and narcotics enforcement continues to increase in significance. 
The Obama administration publicly states recognition of drug addiction as a 
disease that requires balanced policies to effectively address. The 2013 National Drug 
Control Strategy references that in 2010 the “Administration charted a ‘third way’ in drug 
policy, a path that rejects the opposing extremes of legalization or a law enforcement-
only ‘war on drugs.’”105 Actions of advancing criminal justice reform through drug 
treatment courts, promoting human rights and evidence based drug policy, funding of 
community coalitions, and capitalizing on research conducted by scholars on addiction 
are given in support of modest goals of 10–15 percent reduction in various drug related 
areas by 2015.106  
One hundred years after the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, which 
signaled a shift in mindset from addiction perceived as a disease to that of a criminal act, 
the Obama administration is effectively reversing the discussion on how America should 
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view the drug problem. Although discussion on alternative approaches is occurring and 
the stance appears to be changing, Michael Walther points out that only changes of 
accounting methodology are responsible for the appearance of subtle shifts of funding 
towards demand. He states that in reality policies are generally consistent across the 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations with “prevention and treatment remain[ing] 
severely underfunded, while law enforcement and incarceration continue to dominate our 
national drug strategy.”107 
G. CONCLUSION 
The answer to the original question, what led the U.S. to declare a “War on 
Drugs” to the extent that it became a U.S. domestic and foreign policy priority requiring 
annual expenditures of billions of dollars?, has a long list of contributors. Actions of 
multiple government officials and policy makers ultimately culminated in a combination 
of domestic attitudes and policy choices that led towards action in the foreign policy 
arena. The uncertainty of what action to take with regard to opium in the Philippines at 
the turn of the twentieth century began U.S. advocacy for drug control in the international 
sphere. Despite U.S. leadership and organization of the Shanghai Opium Commission 
and subsequent International Opium Convention at The Hague, neither of these events 
created large shifts in specific U.S. policy. The international agreements would do more 
to shape subsequent domestic policy priorities than that of foreign policy. Although there 
had been a long history of U.S. foreign policy actions with respect to drug control, 
President Nixon is credited with declaring the “war” and shifting emphasis towards 
supply-side eradication. This shift towards elimination at the source fundamentally 
altered foreign policy relationships between the U.S. and any nation that produced 
marijuana and any other narcotics trafficked to the American public. The concept of 
elimination at the source continued with varying emphasis until the senior Bush 
administration made direct intervention in source countries of Latin America a top 
national security priority. Drug use, abuse, and addiction continue today, as does the 
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debate on how to mitigate the damaging effects on society. As of 2013, the Obama 
administration has requested $25.4 billion for FY2014 federal drug control.108 It is 
important for policy makers to look to the past and understand what aspects of drug 
control were cost effective, benefited society, and minimized unintended consequences as 
future domestic and foreign policy is formed on drug control. This importance continues 
to take on greater significance with the debate over marijuana as U.S. state and 
international leaders question and effectively turn away from federal policy through 
support of legislative changes that conflict with historical U.S. federal and international 
policy. 
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III. THE FALL AND RISE OF MEDICAL AND RECREATIONAL 
MARIJUANA 
A. FROM MEDICINE TO AN ILLEGAL DRUG 
The concept of using marijuana as a medicine is a mixture of fact and legend with 
a 5000-year history. The year 2737 B.C. is the earliest historical reference that cites 
emperor Shen Nung as including the marijuana plant in his pharmacopeia for medicinal 
use.109 Accounts of marijuana use throughout Asia and the Middle East, for a large 
number of medical and spiritual uses, fill the historical record until the modern day.110 
What is interesting about marijuana is both the long record it has for a multitude of 
ailments, as well as the geopolitical controversy surrounding it. Is it a medicine or a 
recreational drug, and how should it be regulated? The answer to these questions has 
varied and is still being worked out around the globe.  
The United States has a long history with marijuana, but early America’s primary 
use of the plant was industrial in nature for products such as rope and cloth.111 The peak 
of industrial marijuana as a fiber product, commonly referred to as American hemp, 
occurred in the middle of the 1800s and was eventually replaced by cotton, Indian jute, 
and timber.112 Early widespread use of the marijuana plant led its establishment and wild 
growth throughout the nation. As a medicine, it was included in the U.S. pharmacopoeia 
in 1870 with, “over one hundred articles recommending [marijuana] use in medical 
journals between 1840 and 1900.”113 The first indications of controversy started as the 
United States began a major social, industrial, and urban transition. Waves of immigrants 
began to flow into America’s borders with their own religions, languages, and 
customs.114 Erich Goode in Marijuana states, 
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 At the turn of the twentieth century, marijuana use in the United States for 
other than medicinal purposes was almost unknown. About 1910, Mexican 
immigrants brought marijuana into Texas and California and from there it 
seems to have made its way very quickly to New Orleans, where its use 
was established among Negroes….From there it spread to the 
North…where it was introduced to whites on a large scale as a result of 
contact with Negroes in lower-class, racially mixed neighborhoods.115 
The association with immigrants and the lower class began a wave of change to 
marijuana’s legal status. The multi-scalar drive to outlaw marijuana use started at the 
local level, advanced to the state level, and eventually progressed nationally and 
internationally. One early example of local enforcement that resulted in far reaching 
policy began in 1914 El Paso, “The deputy sheriff decided Mexicans should no longer be 
permitted to bring any more ‘loco weed’ across the Rio Grande.”116 Local laws were 
passed to prohibit marijuana with the recommendations passed to federal representatives. 
See Figure 2 for Treasury Decision 35719, which set in motion illegal smuggling charges 
for migrants crossing the U.S. Mexico border with marijuana.  
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Figure 2.  Treasury Department decision to restrict marijuana (cannabis) 
importation117 
Individual states began prohibiting marijuana in a similar fashion to earlier laws 
that outlawed opium and other narcotics as a method to purge the dens, streets, cities, and 
states of the dope fiend menace.118 Every state had passed laws on marijuana by the time 
the federal government passed The Marijuana Tax Act, but the state legislation was 
widely varied. Leading up to the federal Act was creation of a bill designed for adoption 
of state legislatures called The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Lack of uniformity and weak 
state enforcement led to a proposal to create anti-narcotic regulation designed for state 
legislatures to streamline inconsistencies.119 The majority of states did pass the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act and its associated marijuana provision. The buildup of legislation 
from the local level eventually led to changes at the state and federal level to prohibit and 
criminalize marijuana. The process is now repeating itself in reverse as states pass 
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legislation decriminalizing and permitting marijuana for various uses. The Pew Research 
center compiled a map showing 50 state 2013 marijuana laws along with a list of ballot 
initiatives that have been recently rejected. Many of these rejected initiatives may be 
reintroduced in the future. See Figure 3. 
  
Figure 3.  Fifty state marijuana laws in 2013.120 
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B. MEDICAL MARIJUANA 
Support for the medical use of marijuana grew at the local level over a number of 
years before any real change occurred. In 1991, Proposition P, a San Francisco ballot 
initiative to urge the State of California and the California Medical Association to allow 
marijuana for medical purposes, passed with an 80 percent approval rate.121 Additional 
measures were passed in 1994 and 1995, each of which were vetoed by California 
Governor Pete Wilson. Although public support had grown, the approach of urging 
legislators to initiate change had proved unworkable. Advocates for changed turned to 
raising enough signatures to put legalization directly to the voters.122 California passed 
Proposition 215 in November of 1996 with a 56 percent approval rate.123 Partial text of 
the proposition states: 
11362.5. (a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the 
Compassionate Use Act of 1996. 
(b) (1) The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that 
the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows: 
  (A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and 
use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed 
appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has 
determined that the person’s health would benefit from the use of 
marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, 
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which 
marijuana provides relief. 
  (B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and 
use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a 
physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction. 
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  (C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan 
to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all 
patients in medical need of marijuana.124 
 This action marked a turning point in a long-standing debate as to whether 
marijuana was believed, by the average voter, to have medicinal use. The federal 
government maintains marijuana does not have any medical use, yet the voters of 
California, and every other state that has passed medical initiatives since proposition 215, 
say otherwise (although still subject to federal law enforcement). The debate can be fierce 
with individuals on both sides believing the other is completely wrong. It is difficult to 
determine the exact trajectory of medical marijuana’s future with such intense conflict 
and debate. However, California has not been the only state to pass a medical marijuana 
initiative. See Table 2.  
 
                                                 




Table 2.   Summary of state medical marijuana laws125 
Since proposition 215 in 1996, state after state has chosen to enact medical 
marijuana laws and reduce penalties for possession and use of marijuana. If voters were 
simply ignorant to the dangers of marijuana, as maintained by the federal government, 
the significant nationwide expansion of state laws, which have moved away from the 
federal position, most likely would not have occurred. A 2010 Pew Research poll showed 
                                                 
125 “20 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC,” last modified February 26, 2014, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881. Additional detailed 
information on each state law along with links to information on ballot measures, bills, fees, and source 
information can be accessed at the ProCon.org website.  
44 
 
that 73 percent of Americans supported the legalization of medical marijuana.126 As of 
2013, a Fox News poll shows support has increased to 85 percent.127 Currently, there are 
15 additional states that have pending legislation or ballot initiatives to legalize medical 
marijuana.128 Although drug laws tend to take lengthy amounts of time to achieve 
homogeneous levels of change, the advance in state level medical marijuana legalization 
demonstrates a significant disconnect between marijuana’s federal and local perceptions. 
C. RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA 
A large amount of the debate surrounding marijuana has been focused on 
compassionate use for various medical issues. Considering marijuana’s popularly 
accepted ability to deal with pain and disease, it may not be surprising that medicinal use 
has gained support. The use of marijuana for recreational purposes seemed to be on a 
much more difficult path towards legalization. Many reports surrounding the marijuana 
debate would contain some reference to the fact that no state or nation in the world had 
passed any law legalizing recreational use of marijuana. November of 2012 marked 
another turning point for marijuana. The states of Washington and Colorado both passed 
laws to legalize adult recreational use. (The nation of Uruguay also recently passed 
recreational legalization. This will be discussed in the next chapter). These laws are 
distinct and separate from medical marijuana laws in each state. 
1. Washington 
The production, possession, delivery, distribution, and sale of marijuana in 
accordance with the provisions of [i502] and the rules adopted to 
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implement and enforce it, by a validly licensed marijuana producer, shall 
not be a criminal or civil offense under Washington state law.129  
Washington Initiative 502 amends state law to allow adults 21 years and older to 
possess one ounce of usable marijuana, 16 ounces of marijuana infused product in solid 
form, or 72 ounces of marijuana infused product in liquid form.130 The state Liquor 
Control Board was designated the agency responsible to administer a regulatory system 
that licenses production, processing, and retail sales.131 The initiative outlines a strict 
licensing scheme designed to ensure retention of regulatory control by the state. Taxes 
will be 25 percent at each tier of production, processing, and sale for a total of 75 percent. 
These taxes will be deposited in a fund that will primarily distribute to social and health 
services.132 Washington residents are not allowed to home-grow their own recreational 
marijuana supply and are limited to purchasing it from licensed retail outlets expected to 
open for business in June or July of 2014.133 
2. Colorado 
In the interest of the efficient use of law enforcement resources, enhancing 
revenue for public purposes, and individual freedom, the people of the 
state of Colorado find and declare that the use of marijuana should be 
legal for persons twenty-one years of age or older and taxed in a manner 
similar to alcohol.134 
Colorado voters passed Amendment 64 at the same time Washington’s Initiative 
502 was passed. Amendment 64 ultimately added a new Section 16 to Article 18 of 
Colorado’s constitution. The laws are similar in that they are intended for adults of 21 
years or older, possession is limited to one ounce or less, driving under the influence of 
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marijuana is prohibited, the regulation scheme is designed to be similar to alcohol, and 
medical marijuana regulation remains unaffected. The most significant difference is that 
Colorado residents are allowed to grow, process, and transport six marijuana plants, with 
three or fewer being mature.135 This home-grow provision allows residents access to 
marijuana even if they do not live in an area with retail outlets. The Colorado and 
Washington tax structures are also different with regulation responsibility vested in the 
Department of Revenue. Currently, Colorado is following a “vertical integration” model, 
which essentially requires one business to undertake cultivation, production, and sales. 
Colorado’s excise tax is set to 15 percent. After state, local, and a 15 percent excise tax is 
added, Denver consumers pay in the neighborhood of a 29 percent tax rate.136 Retail 
sales of recreational marijuana in the month of January were $14 million with slightly 
over $2 million collected in sales tax.137 
D. CHALLENGES FOR BUSINESS 
The current federal status of marijuana creates several problems for legitimate 
state marijuana business owners. As long as marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, 
it is difficult to rely on a consistent stance from federal prosecutors or comply with 
federal banking regulation.  
Three memorandums have been released from the U.S. Department of Justice 
concerning federal enforcement against business owners involved in state legal 
marijuana. In 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden released a memo stating, “As 
a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not focus federal resources in your 
States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with 
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existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”138 Although no federal 
law had changed, this memo implied that the federal government was tolerant of medical 
marijuana businesses as long as they fully complied with state law and did not violate the 
federal governments core priorities. In 2011, that stance was reversed. The new Deputy 
Attorney General, James M. Cole, released an update to the Ogden memo stating, “The 
Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield such activities from federal 
enforcement action and prosecution, even where those activities purport to comply with 
state law.”139 After Colorado and Washington passed laws legalizing recreational 
marijuana, the federal government waited 9 months before addressing the issue. In 
August 2013, Deputy Attorney general Cole released another memorandum that 
essentially reversed the federal governments stance once again. The memo continues to 
focus on the federal governments core priorities, temporarily defers its right to challenge 
recreational legalization measures, and gives guidance to its prosecutors stating, 
“prosecutors should continue to review marijuana cases on a case-by-case basis and 
weigh all available information and evidence, including, but not limited to, whether the 
operation is demonstrably in compliance with a strong and effective state regulatory 
system.”140 
In addition to the back and forth threat of federal prosecution, marijuana business 
owners face complications with banking. Banks are federally regulated and state 
regulated marijuana businesses are operating outside of federal guidelines. This situation 
forces marijuana businesses to operate on a cash only basis unless they can convince a 
bank to take the risk of working with them. The 2011 Cole memo states, “Those who 
engage in transactions involving the proceeds of such activity may also be in violation of 
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federal money laundering statutes and other federal financial laws.”141 Considering 
Colorado conducted $14 million in marijuana sales for the month of January alone, it is 
not difficult to imagine the security concerns that arise from inability to use a banking 
service. That is a lot of cash. In an effort to address the problem, the DOJ and Treasury 
Department worked together to provide guidance for banks working with state licensed 
marijuana businesses. The document reiterates the 2013 Cole memo core priorities and 
seeks to provide clarification on how to proceed if they choose to do business with the 
marijuana industry.142 Unfortunately, without congressional action to change the federal 
laws, banks are put in a difficult position. CNN quotes the CEO and president of 
American Bankers Association, Frank Keating, as saying:  
While we appreciate the efforts by the Department of Justice and FinCEN, 
[simple] guidance or regulation doesn’t alter the underlying challenge for 
banks. As it stands, possession or distribution of marijuana violates federal 
law, and banks that provide support for those activities face the risk of 
prosecution and assorted sanctions.143 
Although state laws have continued to progress towards increased legalization, 
the conflict between federal and state laws remains. This situation puts legitimate 
business owners at risk and creates a great deal of confusion for Americans. 
E. INTERACTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously praised the division of 
sovereign power included within America’s constitutional structure for its 
capacity to encourage states to “serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” This 
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restrictions….Although simple in theory, the task of determining whether 
a state law is “in conflict” with federal law can be incredibly complex in 
practice.144 
Federal law prohibits marijuana and currently considers it amongst the most 
dangerous drugs in existence. State laws have decriminalized, legalized for medical use, 
and have now gone as far as legalizing recreational marijuana with a tax structure that 
puts money into state accounts. In the 1970s, 11 states took steps to make reductions in 
criminal penalties for small amounts of marijuana.145 Although these changes to state law 
reduced the penalties, they did not change marijuana’s federal or state status as an illegal 
drug. In contrast to simply reducing penalties, current state medical and recreational 
marijuana laws are in apparent conflict with federal law. It is important to understand 
how states have managed to progress despite the federal governments steadfast adherence 
to a most dangerous of all drugs Schedule I mindset. Key concepts of congressional 
supremacy, commandeering, federal resources, federal preemption, and international 
preemption are outlined in order to explain how the simultaneous legal and illegal status 
of marijuana continues to exist.146  
1. Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
The American Constitution divides governmental power between the 
federal government and several state governments. In the event a conflict 
between federal law and state law, the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2) makes it clear that the state policies are 
subordinate to federal policies. There are, however, important limitations 
to the doctrine of federal supremacy.147 
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The U.S. Constitution states, “The Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”148 The clearest 
understanding from the Supremacy Clause is that state marijuana laws cannot supersede 
and therefore invalidate federal law. Based on this constitutional language it might appear 
that federal law would invalidate conflicting state law regarding marijuana. However, 
intentionally designed limitations on federal powers prevent this straightforward 
application. In general, the supremacy clause holds true when federal law legalizes an 
activity and state laws attempt to ban that same activity.149 In the reverse case, similar to 
the legal situation surrounding marijuana, federal bans of activity that states either ignore 
or legalize are complicated by principles of anti-commandeering, simple availability of 
enforcement power, and preemption. 
2. Commandeering 
The federal government is free to enact legislation that bans activities such as the 
cultivation, possession, and distribution of marijuana. It is then free to use federal forces 
to enforce that ban. The federal government can also encourage states to enact similar 
laws to that of the federal government. In the case of drug enforcement, states enforce 
their own laws and often willingly assist the federal government.  What the federal 
government cannot do is require states to enforce federal laws with their own resources. 
This prevents state officials from being compelled to pay for and administer federal 
policy. Doing so would constitute federal commandeering and is generally considered 
unconstitutional.150  
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3. Federal Resources 
 The federal government can encourage states to adopt laws and policies through 
funding incentives or withholding. A recent successful example of aligning state law to 
that of federal law was obtained with the Department of Transportation Appropriations 
Act of FY2001. Any state that failed to adopt a 0.08 blood alcohol content limit was 
subject to losing federal highway construction funds at a rate of 2 percent with increases 
of loss compounding for each year of compliance failure.151 Although the federal 
government could attempt this method with state marijuana laws, the federal government 
relies primarily on state manpower and resources for drug enforcement.152 To understand 
the scope of federal verses local law enforcement, Robert Mikos cites, “Only 1 percent of 
the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal 
authorities.”153 In addition, the ratio of DEA to state and local enforcement officers is 1 
to 170.154 The federal government recognizes that partnership in drug enforcement is 
important to accomplishing federal goals.155 Erosion of this partnership would likely lead 
to further negative effects.156 
4. Preemption 
Preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause. In certain cases, federal law 
preempts or supersedes state law. The main constraint for the power of preemption is the 
anti-commandeering principle.157 Law professor Robert Mikos makes this distinction 
clear by stating, “Congressional laws blocking state action (preemption) are permissible, 
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whereas congressional laws requiring state action (commandeering) are not.”158 
Pertaining to marijuana, the question becomes whether or not the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) preempts various state laws regarding medical and recreational 
marijuana. None of the state laws regarding marijuana require individuals to use 
marijuana; these state laws reduce the penalties or simply allow it for various uses. 
Robert Mikos states, “The Supreme Court has never held that Congress could block states 
from merely allowing some private behavior to occur, even if that behavior is forbidden 
by Congress.”159 Additionally, the language of the CSA was written in an attempt to 
work cooperatively with the states. The federal government recognizes that much of the 
enforcement of drug laws would occur through state action. The CSA states: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indication an intent 
on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision 
operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any state law on 
the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of 
the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of the 
subchapter and the State law so that the two cannot consistently stand 
together.160 
In essence, the federal government has chosen not to control all aspects of 
regulation and has left the states free to enact their own regulation on marijuana as long 
as it does not “positively conflict with the CSA.”161 Going further, the question now 
becomes whether or not state marijuana laws positively conflict with the CSA. In order to 
positively conflict, both laws need to be physically impossible to comply with at the same 
time, or stand as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress.162 Again, state laws do not 
require citizens to use marijuana, if they did, then a positive conflict would exist.  
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Ambiguity begins to arise regarding the allowance of medical or recreational marijuana 
as an obstacle of the objectives of Congress. Legislative Attorneys Todd Garvey and 
Brian Yeh state: 
The extent to which a state law that legalizes, regulates, and taxes 
marijuana for recreational purposes may be preempted by the CSA is a 
novel and unresolved legal question. The federal courts, for instance, have 
not engaged in any substantial analysis of whether federal law preempts 
state marijuana laws. Existing applicable precedent, which has arisen as a 
result of challenges to state medical marijuana laws, has been developed 
almost exclusively by state courts, and even then, mostly by lower court 
decisions that range widely in their approach to the preemption 
question.163  
Arguments can be made that either support or oppose preemption, specifically in 
the case of recreational legalization in Colorado and Washington that mandate regulation 
and taxation. As of August 29, 2013, the United States Department of Justice is, 
“deferring its right to challenge [Colorado and Washington’s] legalization laws.”164 The 
DOJ’s stance is to wait and see how things work out. If Colorado and Washington fail to 
enact a strict regulatory system that protects eight specific federal interests regarding 
marijuana, then “federal prosecutors will act aggressively to bring individual prosecution 
focused on federal enforcement priorities.”165 It appears that Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis’s idea that states can serve as a laboratory is at work.  
5. International Preemption 
The United States is party to several international treaties on drug control and 
enforcement. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances bind the U.S. at the international level to 
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commitments concerning marijuana. In order for the U.S. to remain in compliance with 
various international agreements as they are currently written, the DEA and Department 
of State have determined that marijuana must remain at CSA Schedule I or Schedule 
II.166 Subsequently, petitions to the Attorney General to reschedule marijuana to a lower 
CSA Schedule have been denied on the grounds of international treaty violation.167 
How can Colorado and Washington legalize marijuana considering the United 
States is party to these international agreements? In essence, domestic law is only bound 
by the conditions of the treaties to the same extent that state law is bound to federal law. 
As long as federal law does not preempt state law, the state law is not preempted by 
international law.168 Based on a web of international and domestic ties, it is important for 
the federal government to carefully evaluate any legal action it takes with regard to state 
marijuana laws before it actually does so.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Voters at the state level have legalized various aspects of marijuana use while 
remaining subject to criminal penalties at the federal level. State policies concerning 
marijuana throughout the union are inconsistent at best. See Figure 3. Medical marijuana 
laws have continued to gain acceptance since 1996 and recreational legalization by two 
states in 2012 appear to demonstrate a shift away from federal policy. If this trend 
continues, action at the congressional level will be needed for progress towards 
streamlining state policies and implementing consistent regulation. Marijuana remaining 
in a simultaneous legal and illegal status fails to promote consistent regulation. Moreover, 
a continued advancement of legalization at the state level will continue to place the 
federal government in the conflicting position of telling the international community that 
the United States considers marijuana a Schedule I drug while its population licenses,  
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regulates, and taxes marijuana cultivation, preparation, distribution, and consumption. 
Leadership at the federal level will be required to effectively navigate an international 
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IV. SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
I think a new approach, or at least to open up or break the taboo is what 
the world should do. There are many possibilities, including the possibility 
of legalizing drugs. Politically, I know that this has cost a lot. I have 
already incurred this cost. They have attacked me for saying what I am 
saying to you. But I don’t think politicians or leaders of any country can 
only say what people want to hear—Colombian President Juan Manual 
Santos.169 
Leaders around the world continue to struggle with determining the most effective 
method of controlling drug production, trafficking across borders, and use. The U.S. has 
been a leader in the supply, eradication, and criminalization approach. After decades of 
continued investment and an outcome of mixed results, many leaders are beginning to 
question this approach. Some, such as Portugal and Uruguay, are taking bold measures in 
order to change the dynamic. Many others, to include Colombia and Mexico, are open to 
increased dialog concerning alternate approaches and are taking small steps to move 
away from criminalization. A 2011 CRS report states, “There has been increasing 
criticism of U.S. drug policy coming from prominent observes in countries that have been 
key partners in the struggle against illicit drug trafficking.” The CRS notes that former 
presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have participated in a report that cites the 
current U.S. method of fighting the drug war has failed. Subsequently, former U.S. 
presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter have joined world leaders in declaring this 
model a failure. Marijuana is only part of this debate. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
marijuana is an integral part of the world drug control regime. Debate on the drug war 
involves marijuana; Subsequently, debate on changing marijuana policy inevitably leads 
to questions on how to solve the drug war problem as a whole.  
                                                 
169 Juan Manual Santos, quoted in Breaking The Taboo, directed by Cosmo Feilding-Mellen and 
Fernando Grostein Andrade (2011; London: Sundog Pictures, 2013), iTunes. 
58 
 
B. MEXICO AND COLOMBIA—HISTORY AND FAULTERING 
CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. MODEL 
Although Mexico, Central America, and countries in the Andean region of South 
America have all been highly involved in the U.S. war on drugs in some form or another, 
Colombia and Mexico are stand out cases that have demonstrated an interesting interplay. 
Each time significant success is made with either supply reduction or cartel elimination, a 
new source or group moves in to satisfy the consistent demand.  
A phenomenon known as the “balloon effect” where eradication on one state 
leads to increased levels of production in another is at play in the South American Andes. 
In the 1990’s the U.S. set out to destroy the Medellin and Cali drug cartels that controlled 
a majority of the cocaine production coming out of Colombia. The effort was successful, 
yet had the unintended consequence of strengthening the Marxist group known as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) through pushing cultivation into 
FARC controlled areas and destroying their opposition.170 In the following years, cocaine 
production in Colombia increased seven fold from roughly 100 metric tons in 1990 to 
700 metric tons in 2000.171 Plan Colombia was then announced as a way to assist 
Colombia in increasing state security and reducing illicit narcotics, primarily cocaine. 
Over the next eight years the U.S. invested six billion dollars in this effort with the effect 
of reducing cocaine production by over half and significantly increasing the stability of 
the Colombian state.172 Zooming out, the metric that matters is overall cocaine 
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nine hundred metric tons for the last decade. In keeping with the balloon effect concept, 
production simply shifted to Peru, which is now estimated as the largest cocaine 
producing country in the region.173 
Even more concerning is the unintended consequence of shifting the most violent 
conflict right to the U.S. southern border. Over the last decade narco-violence in Mexico 
has skyrocketed leading to mass murders, beheadings, and mutilation on a grand scale.174 
The death toll is difficult to track accurately, yet estimates are around 60,000 dead in 
Mexico since 2006.175 This shift in violence was brought on by two main factors. First, 
the elimination of Colombian cartels allowed Mexican cartels to take over operations, 
and second, the Mexican government’s recent crackdown propted cartels to increase 
control through more violent means. Similar to Plan Colombia, the U.S. is assisting 
Mexico through a plan called the Merida Initiative. The U.S. committed $1.4 billion over 
a three year period to assist in this effort, yet profits from drug trafficking through 
Mexico are estimated at $25 billion a year.176 Law enforcement is out funded, out 
manned, and out gunned.  
Mexico and Colombia are among the United States strongest allies in Latin 
America and have followed the U.S. lead in the war on drugs. However, based on 
perception of the drug war failure, a change of mindset is occurring. Colombian President 
Juan Manuel Santos has publicly stated he believes a new approach is urgently needed. 
Guatemalan president Otto Perez, and Mexican presidents both past and present, “joined 
Santos…in questioning the last 30 years of international drug policy.”177 In 2009 the 
Mexican federal government passed a decree that decriminalizes small amounts of drugs 
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such as cocaine, heroin, LSD, methamphetamines, and marijuana for personal use.178 In 
2012, Mexican lawmakers introduced legislation aimed at expanding decriminalization 
and setting up medical marijuana dispensaries.179 Mexico is attempting to approach 
recreational marijuana with methods similar to those that Portugal implemented for all 
drugs. Specifically, “the legislation would create ‘dissuasion commissions’ to which 
some violators could be sent for administrative sanctions, in lieu of the traditional 
criminal court process.”180 
C. PORTUGAL—THE ONLY COUNTRY TO DECRIMINALIZE ALL 
DRUGS 
Opposite of prohibition and criminalization is legalization. No nation in the world 
has pursued a policy of complete legalization for all drugs, although there are cases of 
legalization of certain drugs, including marijuana. Somewhere in the middle between 
prohibition and legalization is decriminalization. Decriminalization does not mean that it 
is legal to possess or use an illegal drug. Instead it is a shift in policy that moves the topic 
of drug use and abuse from a criminal act, dealt with in the criminal justice system, to a 
social health issue dealt with in an administrative fashion. In 2001, Portugal became the 
first European Union country to completely decriminalize all drugs.181 The results are 
promising; however, it should be noted that the large success is quite likely due to the 
thorough framework that was instituted along with the legal shift. The nationwide law 
that was put into effect was designed to create complete decriminalization rather than 
simply depenalization. The terms are often used interchangeably, as is the case in the 
United States concerning the reduction of penalties for marijuana. However, the subtly in 
the case of Portugal is important. In a depenalization framework, drug usage is still a 
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crime, yet imprisonment is no longer used for enforcement.182 Several countries in the 
EU have pursued various forms of depenalization, in a similar fashion to various states in 
the U.S., as a shift away from criminalization.  
Portugal took a studied approach to the problem when it felt that drug use and 
abuse were becoming unmanageable social problems. A study by the Commission for a 
National Drug Strategy was funded to determine policy options to the rising drug 
consumption of the 90s and a view that criminalization was possibly exacerbating the 
problem.183 The study determined that decriminalization was the best policy approach 
and further stated that legalization was not currently an option based on numerous 
international treaty obligations.184 The comprehensive approach involves a shifting of 
funds from supporting penal enforcement to treatment and administrative procedures 
through the official Dissuasion Commission. In order to change the social dynamic from 
one of fear, prosecution, and lifelong criminal labeling, the Dissuasion Commission “has 
and overriding goal of…avoid[ing] the stigma that arises from criminal prosecutions.”185 
Rather than decriminalize and walk away from the problem, Portugal has embraced the 
problem as a social/health related one and implemented comprehensive administrative 
and treatment programs that are adequately funded to tackle the reality of drug related 
problems and addiction.  
Drug tourism was an initial fear. Some believed that Portugal would become a 
drug haven for individuals seeking drugs without prosecution. This fear has not only 
failed to materialize, but drug usage has decreased in many key categories with only 
minor increases in others.186 The increases are on par or below worldwide increases in 
drug use. The most important factor, and one that has great concern for the public as well 
as parents, is usage amongst youth. The UNODC world drug report states, “illicit drug 
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use is now characterized by a concentration among youth.”187 This is particularly 
concerning for the long-term outlook on lifetime use and abuse of drugs. In Portugal, 
statistics for 13–15 and 16–18 year olds show a decreased prevalence in nearly every 
substance after passing decriminalization law. Although decriminalization is no magic 
bullet, figures across the board have been relatively positive for Portugal to include drops 
in infectious disease, drug related mortality, and those convicted of drug trafficking.188 
Although marijuana is only decriminalized along with all other drugs, legislation in 2013 
was introduced to legalize small amounts of production and use. The legislation failed to 
pass based on inadequate measures addressing health and safety.189 
D. URUGUAY—THE FIRST COUNTRY TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA 
On December 10, 2013, Uruguay became the first, and currently only, nation in 
the world to fully legalize the production, sale, and consumption of marijuana. Once 
regulation is implemented, the state will set volume and quality measures, licenses will 
be issued for production, sales will take place in pharmacies, and the government will set 
prices designed to undercut the black market.190 Uruguay is party to, and has not 
withdrawn from, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This action breaks a 
portion of the legal provisions of the treaty. The strongest action taken against Uruguay 
for this breach of international law has been memos of concern and regret by the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).191 John Walsh at the Washington Office 
of Latin America (WOLA) stated, “Uruguay is a small country that takes its international 
obligation seriously. They know that [this legislation] is quite at odds with what the 
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global conventions permit.”192 Julio Calzada, Uruguay’s Secretary General of the 
National Drug Council, states, “A society without drugs is a utopia. It’s better to regulate 
the existing market than leave it to organized crime.” He goes on to clarify: 
We are in constant contact with the INCB and will continue to be so. We 
know their visions, they know ours. Uruguay is a sovereign country, with 
an elected parliament and a strong democratic tradition, so we’re going to 
continue with this policy in accordance with our sovereign and democratic 
rights.193 
Uruguay’s action to legalize marijuana has roots in fighting a drug war of its own. 
It is trying to separate marijuana from more destructive drugs. Marijuana is the most 
widely used drug in Uruguay, but it often puts users in contact with dealers of “pasta 
base,” a by-product of cocaine production.194 A BBC report on pasta base notes that the 
drug is often adulterated with caffeine with one user stating,  
I don’t know a drug that is more powerful….If you take a gram of cocaine, 
that’s enough. With pasta base if you consume 1g, 3g, 20g, 30g, you still 
want to take more. And it is not a sociable drug. Pasta base is a drug that 
creates enemies.195  
Additionally, Calzada states, “Uruguayan users are smoking prensado paraguayo, 
a compressed blend of [marijuana] leaves, glue, oil, faeces, chemicals and so on. The mix 
is much more harmful to health than pure [marijuana].”196  For perspective, one percent 
of Uruguayan’s have used cocaine and 14 percent, between the ages of 16 and 64, have 
used marijuana.197 These figures are statistically comparable to the United States. 
Uruguay studied the Netherlands, Portugal, Australia, India, Turkey, and the 
United States to capitalize on experiences of various decriminalization and medicinal use 
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regulation. The aim is to take a new approach to reducing organized crime, creating safe 
access for users, promoting awareness of the dangers of drugs, and to drawing revenue 
that would normally go to drug dealers. Calzada views the U.S. method of attempting to 
eliminate drugs with an iron fist, as it did with “Plan Colombia,” as achieving the “spread 
of organized crime across the entire continent.”198  
E. OTHER NATIONS WITH SHIFTING POLICIES 
Calzada explains: 
[Marijuana] is a truly global phenomenon. Reports on cultivation an 
seizures of [marijuana] and on [marijuana] products illustrate that 
marijuana is not only consumed in all countries in the form of herb, it is 
also grown in most of them.199 
Different nations around the world have made a wide range of policy choices 
concerning marijuana. At one side of the policy spectrum lays regulated legalization 
covering all aspects of marijuana policy from seed to user. Two states and on nation—
Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay now occupy this side of the policy spectrum. On the 
other side, the policy choice is that of complete criminalization of all aspects of 
marijuana and its use. Many nations and their localities fall somewhere in between these 
two extremes. Decriminalization, primarily in the area of possession, has gained 
popularity over the last several decades.200 A comprehensive list of each countries 
marijuana policy is beyond the scope of this paper and is complicated by dynamic 
legislative initiatives that continue to occur as the debate on the marijuana and the 
outcome of the drug war heats up. However, in addition to those already covered, a select 
list of counties with changing policy choices is instructive for understanding policy 
choices that are occurring outside of the U.S. 
The Netherlands, specifically the city of Amsterdam is often misunderstood as 
having a legal marijuana policy. This is not the case. Marijuana is illegal in the 
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Netherlands. The Dutch wanted to enact policy that would separate hard and soft drugs. 
Instead of passing laws that would conflict internationally, the Dutch chose to enact 
regulation that licensed “coffee shops” to permit small amounts of marijuana for sale and 
prevented prosecution for small amounts of marijuana possession.201 Production of 
marijuana is not allowed, other than ignoring five plants for personal use, so these coffee 
shops officially have no legal suppliers.202 In order to avoid international pressure, the 
Dutch have chosen not to enact supply side regulation.203 Contrary to many other nations 
that are loosening policy, the Netherlands has made recent attempts to enact stricter 
policies to curb the very popular marijuana tourism situation. A 2008 law was passed to 
prohibit sales to foreigners and required Dutch citizens to register if they were coffee 
shop patrons. Significant debate led lawmakers to revise the law to drop the registration 
requirement and allow cities to make their own determination on implementation. Some 
such as Maastricht, on the border, have upheld the ban on sales to foreigners while larger 
cities, such as Amsterdam, have scrapped it.204 
Australia’s marijuana policy changes have focused on eliminating criminal 
penalties for possession and growing. Gifts are allowed, but sale of marijuana is still a 
criminal offense. Australia’s states and territories are comparable to U.S. states in that 
each has its own policy. The Australian Capital Territory, South Australia, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory have all decriminalized with various possession and 
plant limitations.205 Peter Reuter states, “The rational for the Australian innovations was 
that removal of criminal penalties for possession were meaningless without similar 
relaxations on the supply side.”206 
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Chile decriminalized possession of small amounts of all drugs for personal 
consumption in 2007. Bills have been introduced and Congressmen have met with 
leaders to understand details of Uruguay’s legalization.207 No legislation has been 
approved as of yet. 
Guatemala’s president Otto Perez Molina, a conservative, has stated, “Central 
American countries should consider legalizing the production, transport and consumption 
of drugs.” He has praised Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington for their innovative 
actions.208 Although discussion of change is happening, possession of any illicit drug, to 
include marijuana, is criminal with penalties described as severe.209 No legislative 
changes have been approved thus far. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although marijuana and drug war policy choices are gaining greater attention, 
few nations have enacted significant changes other than decriminalization or recognizing 
a need for review of the current policies. Additionally, policies concerning marijuana 
tend to address one aspect or another without comprehensive and consistent regulation 
from seed to user. Increased dialog and a willingness to consider the realities of human 
drug consumption trends are a positive step in the right direction. 
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I believe that drugs have destroyed many people, but wrong governmental 
policies have destroyed many more. We really need to look at the policy 
and ask ourselves simply, sincerely, and honestly—Is this policy working? 
What are the effects of this policy and if it is not working, do we have the 
courage to change it?  
Kofi Annan, World Economic Forum 2014210 
Standing on the worldwide stage, the United States has repeatedly pushed for 
stricter enforcement policies, source eradication, and significant criminal penalties for 
any involvement with marijuana and all other illegal substances. Unfortunately data 
suggests that countries with stricter drug use penalties do not have lower rates.211 The 
United States has the highest usage of cocaine and marijuana in the world.212 Cocaine use 
in a data survey of 17 countries revealed that the U.S. rate was so much higher than all 
other countries that is was considered and “outlier.” All drug use categories to include 
those of usage amongst the youth were all higher in the U.S.213 The U.S. also leads in 
incarceration of individuals convicted of a drug offense. As of January 2014, 50 percent 
of inmates in federal prison were incarcerated on drug offenses.214 It is widely 
understood that narcotic substances can be addictive and destructive. Failure to address 
the situation is equivalent to writing off a portion of society as lost, however the current 
criminal system is both writing off a portion of society and subsidizing their existence 
through imprisonment. From an economic supply/demand point of view as well as human 
capital/productivity analysis, the costs to society as well as the U.S. GDP are much 
higher than the funds invested in the current tactic. 
                                                 
210 Kofi Annan, “The Drugs Dilemma: Consequences for Society, Politics and Business,” World 
Economic Forum at Davos Switzerland, January 23, 2014, 
http://webcasts.weforum.org/widget/1/davos2014?p=1&pi=1&a=52638.  
211 Greenwald, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal, 25. 
212 Ibid., 24. 
213 Ibid., 24–25. 
214 U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, “Inmate Statistics: Offenses,” U.S. Department of Justice, 
accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp. 
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Changing attitudes about marijuana are not necessarily the best answer for how to 
proceed with new policies for the drug war as a whole. Instead the greatest benefit is in 
increased dialog and awareness of the alternate approaches to the problem. The end of 
2012 was marked by the states of Colorado and Washington passing legislation to 
legalize marijuana for personal use. They are included with the 20 (plus Washington DC) 
that have legal medical marijuana laws in effect. International leaders not only recognize 
the need for change, but are discussing the need at international forums such as the 
United Nations and the World Economic Forum. It is clear that change is happing with 
regard to societal attitudes of the problem and how to combat it. Decriminalization of all 
drugs, along with legalization of marijuana, is one possible solution among many. 
President Obama’s National Drug Control Strategy 2013 tells us that the administration 
wants to chart a “third way” that balances health and law enforcement. This concept is a 
step in the right direction if the funding for drug addiction treatment actually manifests 
into a shift in policy. Currently, funding amounts do not demonstrate any real detectable 
change in direction. The decision to go down any specific path requires in depth study of 
all current known factors, possibilities, and optimization of outcomes.  
Finally, further study needs to be conducted to assess the possible impacts of 
changing course from the current approach to the war on drugs to options of 
decriminalization/legalization with regulation. The executive and judicial branches of the 
U.S. government need to investigate and seriously consider alternatives. The U.S. cannot 
continue to pursue greater criminalization and enforcement as a strategy while ignoring 
the demand side of the equation. Roughly a trillion dollars have been spent, eradication 
programs have been implemented, and border security has been increased.215 This 
statement should not be construed to indicate that efforts have been ineffective, on the 
contrary a lot of data will show empirical effectiveness in one area or another, yet there is 
no evidence that drug use is disappearing or projected to get significantly better in the 
near future. Cost estimate and effectiveness measurement studies need to be 
commissioned along with organization of public campaigns to help society understand 
                                                 
215 Walther, Insanity: Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy, 15. 
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the true facts and figures. Quick fixes and partial solutions generally lead to unintended 
consequences. It is imperative that a shift in strategy for marijuana or any other drug be 
fully understood, fully funded, and comprehensively implemented. Regardless of heated 
debate on right verses wrong of any policy approach, individual lives and freedom are 
what is at stake regarding all decisions made with respect to marijuana and the war on 
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